Research
Job Market Paper
Formulary Design and Consumer Choices in Medicare Part D.
Abstract
Health insurers use formulary tiering and exclusion to steer patients across competing prescription drugs, and manufacturers pay rebates for formularies that favor their products. This paper studies vertical contracting between Medicare Part D plans and insulin manufacturers and the implications for consumers. I model formulary design as a multi-principal, multi-agent game in which manufacturers offer rebate contracts to insurers that are contingent on formulary choices. I first estimate consumer demand for Part D plans and long-acting insulins and construct insurer and manufacturer payoffs under alternative formularies. I then solve for equilibrium formulary choices and rebate contracts. I evaluate Medicare Part D policies that expand access to insulin: (1) prohibiting exclusion, (2) requiring coverage of biosimilar insulin, and (3) capping patient out-of-pocket (OOP) costs. These policies generate small gains in consumer surplus through broader formulary coverage or lower OOP costs. However, these restrictions weaken insurers' leverage in the contracting game, resulting in lower manufacturer rebates and higher net drug costs for insurers—average rebates fall from 29% under the status quo to 6% when exclusion is prohibited. These results highlight a tradeoff between consumer access and the cost of prescription drugs.
Working Papers
Formulary Restrictions and Drug Rebates: Evidence from Medicare’s Protected Drug Classes (with Alex Olssen and Christopher Adams).
Abstract
Selective contracting with healthcare providers is a common tool used to control costs. In the context of pharmacy benefits, health insurers often design restrictive drug formularies and negotiate rebates from drug manufacturers in exchange for preferable formulary placement. However, formularies for Medicare Part D plans cannot exclude drugs in six “protected” classes. We evaluate the price effects of this policy by comparing Part D rebates with rebates in the commercial insurance market, where insurers have more freedom to exclude drugs from their formulary. Our analysis leverages detailed administrative data on the universe of discounts in Part D, Medicaid, and 340B at the drug-plan-year level from 2012 to 2020. We combine detailed data on rebates across all major government programs with data on aggregate net discounts from SSRHealth to back out estimates of rebates for outpatient drugs in commercial health insurance. Our estimates suggest that policies that restrict the formularies that insurers can use result in modest effects on drug prices, insurer costs and federal spending in the Part D program.
Work in progress
Bargaining with State Regulators: Application to Health Insurance Exchanges
